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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our nation was founded on the premise that the door will be equally 
open to all.
1
  Yet, for much of the nation’s history, children of color were 
  
 * Kristina M. Campbell received her J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center in May 
2011, graduating summa cum laude.  She received a B.B.A. in Accounting from Texas A&M Universi-
ty in May 2008, graduating cum laude.  Ms. Campbell wishes to thank Professor Craig Joyce of the 
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not allowed to attend school with white children, and were instead required 
to attend separate, often ill-equipped schools.
2
  The passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment and its explicit mandate that no state shall deny to any 
person the equal protection of the laws
3
 began a commitment to color-
blindness by the Court.
4
  With this commitment, the Court abandoned the 
notion that separate could be “equal” in education.5 
It is against this background that former Supreme Court Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor’s impact on the Court’s race and education jurisprudence is 
noteworthy.  During her tenure, Justice O’Connor maintained a firm com-
mitment to both equality and the ability of students to receive an excellent 
and diverse education.
6
  While this commitment is significant, it is Justice 
O’Connor’s embrace of strict scrutiny judicial review in all cases of race-
based decision-making by state actors, first as a dissenting member of the 
Court and finally as a leader of the majority of the Court,
7
 that is Justice 




This paper explores the impact of Justice O’Connor on the Court’s race 
and education jurisprudence, both in the context of primary through sec-
ondary school education and in public universities.  Section II outlines 
Justice O’Connor’s biography and explores several external influences on 
the Justice.  Section III reviews the Court’s race and education jurispru-
dence prior to Justice O’Connor’s appointment to the Court.  Section IV 
exposes the Court’s jurisprudence in this area during Justice O’Connor’s 
time on the Court, with an emphasis on those opinions authored by Justice 
O’Connor.  Section V offers an analysis of the aftermath of Justice 
O’Connor’s race and education jurisprudence, beginning with Section 
V(A) addressing the state of the law after Justice O’Connor’s majority 
  
University of Houston Law Center, who teaches an annual seminar on the contributions of Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, for his inspiration and assistance in writing this paper, the editors of this Law 
Review for their careful editing of this paper, and finally, Ben Williams, for his encouragement and 
support. 
 1. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 259 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (stating “the door 
ought to be equally open to all”). 
 2. See infra notes 48–64 and accompanying text (describing cases that allowed for separate educa-
tion). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 4. See Kristina M. Campbell, Note, Will Equal Again Mean Equal?: Understanding Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 385, 387 & nn.6–7 (2010) (noting the Court’s response to the 14th 
Amendment). 
 5. See infra notes 65–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board 
of Education). 
 6. See infra Section IV (examining Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudence on the Court). 
 7. See infra Section IV (tracing this evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence). 
 8. See Roberto L. Corrada, Ricci’s Dicta: Signaling a New Standard for Affirmative Action under 
Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 241, 245-46 (2011) (“The key jurist on affirmative action has been 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.”). 
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opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger. Section V(B) discusses the Court’s race 
and education jurisprudence following Justice O’Connor’s tenure, primari-
ly through an analysis of Parents Involved in Community Schools. Finally, 
Section V(C) hypothesizes the future of race-conscious decision-making in 
education and Justice O’Connor’s legacy through the lens of Fisher v. Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin. Section VI concludes this paper. 
II.  ABOUT JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 
Sandra Day O’Connor was born in March 1930 and grew up on a cattle 
ranch on the Arizona-New Mexico border, known as “Lazy B.”9  She at-
tended the private Radford School for Girls in El Paso, Texas, beginning at 
age six, and she spent the academic semesters living with her grandmother 
in El Paso.
10
  During her vacations from school, Sandra returned to Lazy B 
and worked alongside the rest of the family.
11
  After she graduated from 
high school, she attended Stanford University in California.
12
  Sandra then 
attended law school at Stanford, where she was an outstanding student and 
member of the Law Review.
13
  She met her husband, John O’Connor, dur-
ing law school.
14
  After law school, Sandra practiced law in both the public 
and private sectors, and in many ways, she settled for whatever work she 
could secure as a female lawyer.
15
  She became involved in politics in the 
1960s, first in the local Republican Party, and eventually as an Arizona 
Senator.
16
  In 1975, Sandra was elected to a state trial judgeship in Arizo-
na, and in 1979, she joined the Arizona Court of Appeals.
17
  In 1981, she 
was nominated to the United States Supreme Court by President Reagan, 
and she was confirmed as the first female Justice on the Court that same 
year.
18
  In 2006, Justice O’Connor retired from the Court.19 
  
 9. JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME COURT 
BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 11 (2006). 
 10. BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 16.  Sandra attended a local public school in New Mexico, twenty 
miles from Lazy B, for her eighth grade year.  However, she returned to Radford for the rest of her 
secondary education.  Id. at 19. 
 11. Id. at 19–20. 
 12. Id at 22. 
 13. Id.at 25–26. 
 14. Id.at 26–27. 
 15. BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 28–30. 
 16. See id. at 31 (noting her involvement in the local Republican Party), 35 (noting her experience in 
the Arizona Senate). 
 17. See id. at 65–66 (noting her state trial judgeship), at 68 (noting her appointment to the state 
Court of Appeals). 
 18. Id. at 98. 
 19. Craig Joyce, A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1257, 1271 (2006). 
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Before delving into the opinions Justice O’Connor authored during her 
time on the Court, it is first useful to examine her writings, both reflective 
and analytical, to gain insight into her judicial philosophy.  First, Justice 
O’Connor’s writings evidence her strong belief in the importance of educa-
tion, not only for the individual, but also for the American democracy.
20
  
Of note, she attended school in El Paso, not in Arizona where her immedi-
ate family lived, as a result of the poor primary and secondary education 
available in rural Arizona at the time.
21
  Her family encouraged her to pur-
sue higher education, including law school, a not entirely common experi-
ence for a woman at the time.
22
  These experiences provided her with the 
educational background necessary to succeed, first as a lawyer and later as 
a Supreme Court Justice.  Consequently, Justice O’Connor not only appre-
ciated education, but greatly benefited from it. 
Justice O’Connor’s writings also evidence a unique understanding of 
the impact of race in the United States.
23
  In a 1992 article published in the 
Stanford Law Review, entitled “Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a 
Raconteur,” Justice O’Connor wrote of when Thurgood Marshall changed 
the nation through Brown v. Board of Education.
24
  O’Connor reflects that 
she had not been personally exposed to racial tensions before Brown, as 
Arizona did not have a large African American population during her 
childhood, and further, unlike many southern states, Arizona had never 
adopted a de jure system of segregation.
25
  Even though O’Connor spent 
her eighth-grade year in a predominantly Latino public school in New 
Mexico, she has written that she never had a personal sense of being a mi-
nority in a culture that cared much more for the majority.
26
  Additionally, 
during her childhood, Justice O’Connor’s father employed a Mexican 
American cowboy, “Rastus,” on the family ranch.27  Justice O’Connor 
speaks highly of Rastus in her writings, noting that he became part of the 
family, and admiring the high standards he set for himself and those 
  
 20. See SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 274 (Craig Joyce ed., 2004) (noting 
the effects of an educated society). 
 21. See BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 16 (noting the limited educational opportunities available near 
Lazy B). 
 22. See id. at 22 (discussing her attendance at Stanford). 
 23. See infra notes 24–30, 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O’Connor’s com-
ments). 
 24. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1217, 1217 (1992) (“It was through Brown v. Board of Education that [Justice Marshall] compelled us, 
as a nation, to come to grips with some of the contradictions within ourselves.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR & H. ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A CATTLE RANCH IN THE 
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 53 (2003). 
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around him, both professionally and personally.
28
  Despite the roadblocks 
Rastus faced—“being small, crippled, fatherless, a minority race in his 
birthland”—Justice O’Connor has reflected that Rastus “played the hand 
he was dealt like a master” and found respect.29  Despite not being person-
ally exposed to the type of discrimination the children in Brown experi-
enced in segregated schools, Justice O’Connor was shaped by the personal 




While Justice O’Connor did not experience discrimination based on 
her race in educational or career opportunities, she did experience discrim-
ination as a result of her gender.
31
  When she was on Lazy B with her fami-
ly, young Sandra Day was expected to, and did, contribute to the same 
degree as the men in her family, even participating in roundups.
32
  Further, 
when she attended Stanford University in the late 1940s, she joined some 
two thousand female students, which constituted nearly a quarter of en-
rolled undergraduates.
33
  Her husband appreciated her independence and 
ambition, a rarity in the 1950s.
34
  However, she had significant difficulties 
securing her first job after law school, as firms would only hire women as 
legal secretaries, instead of as practicing lawyers.
35
  Justice O’Connor’s 
experiences led her to champion better job opportunities for women and 
equal pay for equal work as a state senator.
36
   As a Justice on the Supreme 
Court, she noted that what was important about her appointment was “not 
that [she would] decide cases as a woman, but that she [is] a woman who 
will get to decide cases.”37 
Justice O’Connor’s writings evidence a deep understanding of the dis-
crimination many have felt in pursuing opportunities, particularly resulting 
from race and gender discrimination.
38
  Further, her writings evidence a 
strong belief that the framers drafted a Constitution that held the promise 
  
 28. O’CONNOR, supra note 27, at 58–59. 
 29. Id. 
 30. O’Connor, supra note 25, at 1217; see also O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 135–36 (recounting 
Justice Marshall’s stories). 
 31. O’Connor, supra note 25, at 1219.  
 32. See, e.g., O’CONNOR, supra note 27, at 96 (noting Justice O’Connor’s participation in the previ-
ously all-male roundups). 
 33. BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 22. 
 34. See id.at 28 (“But she must have known the deeper commitment she was winning from a 1950s 
husband: an appreciation of her independence and ambition and a willingness to sacrifice some of his 
own drive for hers.”). 
 35. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting Justice O’Connor’s experiences with gender 
discrimination). 
 36. BISKUPIC, supra note 9, at 52. 
 37. Id.at 103. 
 38. See generally O’Connor, supra note 25 (Justice O’Connor discussing her own experiences and 
the stories Justice Marshall shared with her). 
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of equality.
39
  This awareness is joined by an assumption of responsibility 
for narrowing the gap between “the ideal of equal justice and the reality of 
social inequality.”40  In her writings, Justice O’Connor has expressed a 
great respect for the dedication and commitment to the Constitution of the 
many judges that shaped the struggle for civil rights, particularly in the 
battle over the desegregation of schools.
41
  
Justice O’Connor’s story is impressive, as she rose from humble be-
ginnings on a cattle ranch to the first woman appointed to the United States 
Supreme Court.
42
  Her writings and jurisprudence evidence a deep com-
mitment to equality and education and a profound respect for the role of 
the Court.
43
  A searching review of her biography and the opinions she 
authored suggest that her jurisprudence is perhaps no accident; rather, her 
experiences shaped her rulings as a member of the Court.
44
  The following 
sections will note these correlations in the larger context of an exploration 
and analysis of Justice O’Connor’s race and education jurisprudence.45 
III. RACE AND EDUCATION JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JUSTICE 
O’CONNOR’S APPOINTMENT 
We must consider public education in the light of its full develop-
ment and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.  
Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public 




Before exploring Justice O’Connor’s impact on the Court’s race and 
education jurisprudence, it is first useful to explore the Court’s jurispru-
dence in this area prior to Justice O’Connor’s appointment to the Court.  
As such, this section will trace the Court’s race and education jurispru-
dence, both in higher education and in the K-12 context, from the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution to Justice O’Connor’s appointment in 1981.47 
  
 39. See O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 268 (noting the “Framers’ promises of equality”). 
 40. O’Connor, supra note 25, at 1218. 
 41. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the American Judicial Tradition, 59 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1990); see also O’CONNOR, supra note 20, at 246 (noting that the Court took “a 
leading role in the issue of race relations in the United States”). 
 42. See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text (outlining Justice O’Connor’s background and 
experiences). 
 43. See supra notes 20–41 and accompanying text (exploring various writings by Justice O’Connor). 
 44. See generally Joyce, supra note 19 (suggesting such a connection). 
 45. Infra Section V. 
 46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954). 
 47. Infra Section III. 
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Education has historically been a matter belonging to the states, and 
absent “clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme 
law of the land,” the early Court was especially reluctant to interfere.48  In 
this deferential spirit, the early 20th century Court upheld state laws
49
 that 
authorized maintenance of separate schools for children of the white and 
colored races
50
 and made teaching children of all races together illegal, in 
both public and private schools.
51
 
Despite this deferential approach, the Court began to place some limit 
on the states’ ability to discriminate under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
the late 1930s.
52
  In Missouri v. Canada,
53
 the Court noted that the consti-
tutional permissibility of laws separating the races in the enjoyment of 
state privileges was dependent upon equal privileges being given to the 
separated groups in the state.
54
  Resort to opportunities elsewhere was not 
enough to mitigate a state’s discrimination; rather, the Court required that 
the State itself provide equal, even if separate, opportunities.
55
  Because 
Missouri provided a law school only for its white citizens, the Court found 




In the 1950s, the Court began to define this notion of equal opportunity 
in the education context.
57
  In Sweatt v. Painter,
58
 the Court held that the 
state providing one law school for whites and one law school for colored 
students was not enough; rather, there must be “substantial equality” in the 
educational opportunities.
59
  The Court looked to the number and reputa-
tion of faculty, experience of the administration, variety of courses, size of 
the student body, scope of the library, availability of student activities, and 
  
 48. See Cumming v. Cnty, Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) (“the education of the people in 
schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective states”). 
 49. While the Court most often reviewed cases wherein a state law explicitly authorized separation 
of the races, the Court treated cases where such a policy was intended similarly. See, e.g., Missouri v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 344 (1938) (noting the intended policy “to separate the white and negro races”). 
 50. Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 82, 87 (1927).  “Colored races” has been used to refer not only to 
children of African American dissent, but also of the “brown, yellow, and black races”—essentially, to 
all non-Caucasian races.  Id. at 82. 
 51. Brea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908). 
 52. Infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
 53. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
 54. Id. at 349. 
 55. See id. at 350 (“Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can be 
performed only where its laws operates.”). 
 56. Id. at 352; see also Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948) (hold-
ing that the State must provide a legal education for colored students if it provides such an education 
for white students). 
 57. Infra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
 58. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 59. Id. at 633–34. 
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standing in the community to measure equality.
60
  Finding significant dis-
crepancies in the two law schools, the Court held that the Equal Protection 
Clause required that the colored law student petitioner be admitted to the 
state’s white law school.61  That same year in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Education,
62
 the Court held that once a student was 
admitted to a state-supported graduate school, even if he was of a different 
race than the majority of other students, the state must afford the student 
the same treatment as students of other races.
63
  As a result, it became clear 
by the early 1950s that outer appearance of equality was not enough; ra-
ther, the Constitution required the states to provide truly equal opportuni-
ties to its students.
64
 
By the mid-1950s, the Court’s growing insistence on actual, substan-
tive equality set the stage for its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.
65
  Because all tangible measures before the Court indicated that 
the primary and secondary schools that white and colored children attended 
in Kansas were equal, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications 
and salaries of teachers, and other factors, the Court was squarely faced 
with the question of whether segregation solely on the basis of race de-
prives children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities, 
even if tangible factors are equal.
66
  The Court found that it did and that in 
the field of public education, “the doctrine of separate but equal has no 
place.”67  Brown clarified the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment—that 
no state can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”68  In subsequent cases, the Court reinforced this holding, not-
ing that state governments and school boards alike were bound by Brown.
69
 
After Brown, the nationwide system of segregated schools and an en-
tire set of practices that denied citizens rights on account of their race con-
flicted with the Court’s command of equality.70  The Court had many op-
portunities to clarify the implications of its holding that, legally, separate 
was no longer equal as plaintiffs challenged the policies of their state gov-
  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 636. 
 62. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
 63. Id. at 642. 
 64. Supra notes 59 and 63 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s requirement that the plaintiffs 
receive truly equal educational opportunities). 
 65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 66. Id. at 492–93. 
 67. Id. at 495.  
 68. O’Connor, supra note 41, at 11. 
 69. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954)). 
 70. O’Connor, supra note 41, at 11. 
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ernments and local school boards.
71
  The Court struck down school board 
policies that allowed students, upon request, to transfer to another school 
solely on the basis of its racial composition
72
 and held that counties could 
not close all public schools when the result would be unequal education 
opportunities at private schools.
73
 
By the mid-1960s, the Court noted that the time for mere deliberate 
speed in desegregation had run out
74
 and remnants of unequal education 
must be remedied immediately.
75
  Where plaintiffs could prove that a cur-
rent condition of segregated schooling existed and was compelled or au-
thorized by state action, the Court imposed on states the “affirmative duty 
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in 
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”76  Even 
if the segregation resulted from free transfer policies
77
 or statutes forbid-
ding educational decisions based on race,
78
 rather than through designated 
separate schools, the Court found that, in each case, the state’s complacent 
actions violated the Equal Protection Clause.
79
  The Court sanctioned dis-
trict court orders requiring certain numbers of minority teachers and staff 
members per school,
80
 the drawing of geographic attendance zones to 
achieve greater racial balance,
81
 and the use of mathematical ratios of white 
to black students
82
 as reasonable steps toward eliminating discrimination.  
Finally, the Court held that schools could not deny admission to prospec-
tive students because they were not white.
83
 
However, by the mid-1970s, the Court began to limit the duty of states 
to address racial discrepancies in education, noting that federal remedial 
  
 71. See, e.g., infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (highlighting such cases). 
 72. Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688 (1963) (“The recognition of race as an absolute criteri-
on for granting transfers which operate only in the direction of schools in which the transferee’s race is 
in the majority is no less unconstitutional than its use for original admission or subsequent assignment 
to public schools.”). 
 73. Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964). 
 74. Id. at 234. 
 75. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 199 (1965). 
 76. Monroe v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 391 U.S. 450, 458 (1968) (citing Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 
430, 437–38 (1968)). 
 77. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 440; Monroe v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968). 
 78. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45–46 (1971).  The Court noted: “To forbid, at 
this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race would deprive school authorities of the one tool 
absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual school 
systems.”  Id. at 46. 
 79. Id.; Green, 391 U.S. at 440; Monroe, 391 U.S. at 459 (1968). 
 80. United States v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 236 (1969). 
 81. McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971). 
 82. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971) (approving such ratios 
as “starting point[s]”). 
 83. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (“It is apparent that the racial exclusion 
practiced by the Fairfax-Brewster School and Bobbe’s Private School amounts to a classic violation of 
[28 U.S.C.] 1981.”). 
File: Campbell Article Created on:  12/4/2012 8:31:00 PM Last Printed: 12/11/2012 3:04:00 AM 
248 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 10 No. 2  
power may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation, and 
as with any equity case, the nature of the violation would determine the 
scope of the remedy.
84
  In Milliken v. Bradley,
85
 the Court held that before 
imposing cross-district school remedies, the plaintiff must first show that 
there has been a constitutional violation within one district that has pro-
duced a significant segregative effect in another district.
86
  Remedies must 
be designed to restore the victims of discrimination, not as a justification to 
consider race in the placement of students.
87
  Finally, in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke,
88
 a plurality of the Court found that the 
University’s Medical School admissions process, which reserved 16 out of 
the available 100 positions in the class for minority applicants, was imper-
missible.
89
  Amongst several splintered opinions, four different members of 
the Court joined Justice Powell in finding that the State could consider race 
in admissions, provided that such consideration is devised to achieve a 
diverse student body within the University.
90
  Bakke has been said to mark 
the Court’s “retreat from race,” as the Court began to substantially limit 
states’ efforts to address racial discrepancies in schools.91 
By 1980, the Court firmly established that separate was no longer 
equal in the context of education and that remedying past discrimination 
was a compelling government interest.
92
  The Court heard several cases in 
which school districts had refused to undo years of segregation, but the 
Court was just beginning to establish the boundaries for the ability of states 
to consider race in the context of education.
93
  It is against this background 
  
 84. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974) (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 300). 
 85. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717. 
 86. Id. at 744–45; see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 455, 467 (1979) (allow-
ing for system-wide remedy because the school board’s segregative actions impacted the entire sys-
tem); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977) (finding that the system-wide reme-
dy fashioned by the district court went beyond the scope of the “three instances of segregative action”). 
 87. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 746 (“[T]he remedy is necessarily designed . . . to restore the victims 
of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.”). 
 88. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 89. See id. at 271 (affirming the California court’s holding that the University’s special admissions 
program was unlawful).  Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens concurred in this part of Justice 
Powell’s opinion.  Id.  
 90. Justice Powell was joined in this part of his opinion by justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun.  Id. at 272.  Justice Powell argued that race or ethnic background could be used as “simply 
one element—to be weighed fairly against other elements—in the selection process,” but no other 
members of the Court joined that part of his opinion.  Id. at 318.  Justice Powell urged for the applica-
tion of “the most exacting scrutiny” to this type of case, and four members of the Court chose to apply 
“strict scrutiny.”  Compare id. at 291 (Powell, J.) with id. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, J.). 
 91. Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 971 (2010). 
 92. See supra Section III (tracing the Court’s jurisprudence before Justice O’Connor’s appointment 
to the Court). 
 93. See supra note 70–91 and accompanying text (exploring the Court’s jurisprudence after Brown). 
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that Justice O’Connor was appointed to the Court and grappled with leav-
ing her mark on the Court’s race and education jurisprudence.94 
IV. THE COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE DURING JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S 
TENURE 
When Justice O’Connor joined the Court in 1981, the Court no longer 
subscribed to the notion that separate is equal.
95
  Yet, the Court had not yet 
formalized this commitment to equality by applying the strictest level of 
judicial review to each instance of discrimination.
96
  By the end of Justice 
O’Connor’s tenure, however, the Court firmly adopted strict judicial re-
view in all claims of race-conscious decision making by state actors.
97
  
This section will trace this evolution of the Court’s race and education ju-
risprudence during Justice O’Connor’s time on the Court.98 
A. Early Cases 
During the earliest years of Justice O’Connor’s time on the Court, the 
Court was frequently faced with the difficult question of how far a state 
could—or should—go in remedying discrepancies between the races in 
public schools.
99
  In Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los 
Angeles,
100
 Justice O’Connor joined the majority in holding that the State 
could amend its Constitution to provide no further remedies than those 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment, and further, that the State was not 
required to provide pupil-school assignment or pupil transportation where 
segregation that violates the Equal Protection Clause did not exist.
101
  
However, unlike in Crawford, a majority of the Court in Washington v. 
Seattle School District No. 1
102
 invalidated a facially neutral state statute 
that prohibited school assignment on the basis of race, on the grounds that 
  
 94. See infra Section IV (discussing significant cases in this area during Justice O’Connor’s time on 
the Court). 
 95. Supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra Section III (discussing the Court’s race and education holdings prior to Justice 
O’Connor’s appointment). 
 97. Infra notes 123–162 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s continued application of strict 
scrutiny). 
 98. Infra Section IV. 
 99. See generally, e.g., Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 542, 545. 
 102. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
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it violated the Equal Protection Clause.
103
  Four members of the Court dis-
sented in Washington, including Justice O’Connor, arguing that the school 
districts had no federal constitutional obligation to adopt mandatory busing 
programs, and as such, could enact legislation that did not allow students to 
be assigned on the basis of race.
104
 
Although Justice O’Connor’s votes in Crawford and Washington evi-
dence a view that a states’ responsibility to combat racial discrepancies in 
public schools is limited to remedying violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause,
105
 there is no doubt that she believed that children’s inability to 
receive an education in a racially integrated school was “one of the most 
serious injuries recognized in our legal system.”106  In Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education,
107
 a plurality of the Court applied strict scrutiny re-
view to the school board’s actions and held that the school board’s policy 
of extending preferential protection against layoffs to some employees 
because of their race violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
108
  Justice 
O’Connor wrote separately concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment, embracing strict scrutiny review of any type of racial classification 
but applying the narrowly tailored component of the analysis differently 
than the rest of the plurality.
109
  Justice O’Connor subscribed to Justice 
Powell’s formulation of strict scrutiny in his plurality opinion—that racial 
classification must be justified by a compelling government interest and 
the means chosen by the state to effectuate its purpose must be narrowly 
tailored.
110
  Foreshadowing later opinions, Justice O’Connor embraced two 
state interests as compelling in Wygant: remedying past or present discrim-
ination by a state actor, and promoting racial diversity in higher educa-
tion.
111
  Justice O’Connor wrote similarly in her dissent in United States v. 
Paradise,
112
 calling for strict scrutiny review.
113
  In 1989, Justice O’Connor 
garnered four votes, but still no majority of the court, to apply strict scruti-
ny to the city’s racial classifications in awarding construction contracts in 
  
 103. Compare Crawford, 458 U.S. at 545 (finding no discriminatory purpose and therefore no Equal 
Protection Clause violation) with Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486–87 (1982) 
(finding undue burden on racial minorities and therefore an Equal Protection Clause violation). 
 104. Washington, 458 U.S. at 491–92 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 105. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O’Connor’s opinions in 
these cases).  
 106. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984). 
 107. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 108. Id. at 283–84. 
 109. Id. at 285 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 286.  
 112. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
 113. Id. at 196 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company.
114
  Again in 1990, in Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, Justice O’Connor pressed for strict scrutiny 
review of all racial classifications—even those that benefit minorities—and 
was joined in her dissent by three other members of the Court.
115
  A major-
ity of the Court chose instead to apply intermediate scrutiny to the federal 
regulations at issue, on the basis that these regulations benefited, instead of 
burdened minorities.
116
   
In 1991, Justice O’Connor joined a majority of the Court to place a 
further limit on public school desegregation plans in Board of Education of 
Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell.
117
  The Court emphasized the 
intended transitory nature of desegregation decrees—that federal supervi-
sion of local school systems was intended as only a temporary measure to 
remedy past discrimination.
118
  As a result, the Court found that where lo-
cal authorities had acted in compliance with a desegregation decree and no 
evidence of de jure segregation remained, the decree should be dis-
solved.
119
   
However, in 1992, a majority of the Court, including Justice 
O’Connor, made clear in United States v. Fordice that it had not aban-
doned its central holding in Brown.
120
  The Fordice Court noted that a state 
does not discharge its constitutional obligation until it eradicates policies 
and practices traceable to its prior system that continue to foster segrega-
tion, and that the adoption and implementation of race-neutral policies 
alone does not suffice to demonstrate that the prior segregated system has 
completely been abandoned.
121
  Justice O’Connor concurred in the judg-
  
 114. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).  
 115. 497 U.S. 547, 602–03 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  Justice O’Connor was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kenne-
dy.  Id. at 602. 
 116. Id. at 563.  Some commentators have noted the Court’s oscillation between applying strict 
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny review to racial classifications that benefit minorities during that 
time, from Croson to Metro Broadcasting to Adarand.  See generally Matthew Scutari,  “The Great 
Equalizer”: Making Sense of the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 97 GEO. L.J. 917, 
933 (2009); Dianne Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens and Equally Impartial Government, 43 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 885, 908 (2010).  Eventually, the Court settled on applying strict scrutiny review to all 
race-based classifications, whether intended to be discriminatory or benign.  Infra note 123 and accom-
panying text (noting Justice O’Connor’s success in leading the Court to apply strict scrutiny review to 
all racial classifications). 
 117. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). See infra note 119 and accompanying text (stating the Court’s holding). 
 118. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247–48. 
 119. Id.  In 1992, a majority of the Court took Dowell one step further, finding that a district court 
may relinquish supervision and control over a school district in incremental stages before full compli-
ance has been achieved in every area of operations.  Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992). 
 120. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 727–28 (1992). 
 121. Id. 
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ment, noting that it was the State’s burden to prove that it has undone its 
prior segregation, which should, “by now, be only a distant memory.”122 
In 1993, Justice O’Connor finally had a majority of votes from the 
Court in Shaw v. Reno to impose strict scrutiny review on racial classifica-
tions.
123
  In Shaw, Justice O’Connor labeled the State’s reapportionment 
plan, which placed into one district all individuals who belonged to the 
same race but had little in common besides the color of their skin, as “po-
litical apartheid,” and she noted that the Court had rejected such percep-
tions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.
124
  Justice O’Connor 
again garnered support from a majority of the Court to impose strict scruti-
ny review on all racial classifications, regardless of whom they benefited, 
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.
125
  The Adarand Court not only 
overruled Metro Broadcasting, but also erased any doubt that strict scruti-
ny review would be applied when the government considers race.
126
  At the 
same time, O’Connor’s majority opinion in Adarand sought to “dispel the 
notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact,” noting that 
the government is not disqualified from acting in response to racial dis-
crimination and leaving open the possibility that some race-based actions 
could later be found permissible.
127
   
By the end of the 20th century, Justice O’Connor had firmly estab-
lished strict scrutiny review as the Court’s standard of review for race-
conscious decision-making by state actors.
128
  By the time the University of 
Michigan cases, Grutter v. Bollinger
129
 and Gratz v. Bollinger,
130
 reached 
the Court, Justice O’Connor and a majority of the Court were poised to 
strike down race-conscious acts of state officials that were not narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, whether in the con-
text of employment or education.
131
   
  
 122. Id. at 744–45 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 123. 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993). 
 124. Id. at 647.  Justice O’Connor again applied strict scrutiny to racial classifications in the public 
education context in her concurrence in Missouri v. Jenkins. 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995). 
 125. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 237. 
 128. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O’Connor’s majority opin-
ions in Shaw and Adarand). 
 129. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 130. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 131. See supra notes 1284–128 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s adoption of strict scrutiny 
review). 
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1. The University of Michigan Admissions Cases 
In 2003, the Court reviewed two university admissions policies from 
the University of Michigan—those of the Office of Undergraduate Admis-
sions and of the Law School.
132
  In these two cases, the Court applied strict 
scrutiny review for the first time to race-based actions of university actors 
and issued separate but closely related opinions.
133
 
In Gratz, the Court considered the University of Michigan’s Office of 
Undergraduate Admissions process, which utilized a selection index in 
which an applicant could score up to 150 points.
134
  Each applicant re-
ceived points based on high school grades and the quality of the applicant’s 
high school, standardized test scores, in-state residency, alumni relation-
ships, personal essay, personal achievement or leadership, and notably, 
applicants from underrepresented minority or racial groups automatically 
received twenty points.
135
  Writing for a majority of the Court, which in-
cluded Justice O’Connor, Justice Rehnquist applied strict scrutiny to the 
University’s admissions procedures and required that the University 
demonstrate that their use of race was “narrowly tailored [to] further com-
pelling government interests.”136  Justice Rehnquist recognized that diver-
sity was a compelling interest for the University, pursuant to the Court’s 
opinion in Grutter, which was decided on the same day.
137
  However, the 
Court held that the University’s use of race in its freshman admissions pol-
icy was not narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted compelling interest in 
diversity.
138
  Justice O’Connor wrote separately in Gratz to note that the 
weakness of the University’s admissions process was that it “did not pro-
vide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants.”139 
The Court considered the University of Michigan’s Law School admis-
sions process in Grutter.
140
  The Law School looked for individuals with 
“substantial promise for success in law school” and a “strong likelihood of 
succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways,” and 
they aspired to “achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich 
everyone’s education.”141  Rather than assigning points to various applicant 
  
 132. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244 (reviewing the admissions policy of the Office of Undergraduate 
Admissions); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306 (reviewing the law school admissions policy). 
 133. See infra notes 134–156 and accompanying text (exploring the Court’s Grutter and Gratz opin-
ions). 
 134. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 270. 
 137. Id. at 268. 
 138. Id. at 275. 
 139. Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 140. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 141. Id. at 314–15. 
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characteristics, as the Office of Undergraduate Admissions did in Gratz, 
the Law School admissions policy stated that admissions officials should 
“look beyond grades and test scores” to “soft variables,” such as the enthu-
siasm of recommenders and the diversity of the applicant.
142
  Utilizing this 
admissions process, the Law School sought to enroll a “critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students,” although it did not define the term 




Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor first noted that the Court 
had last addressed the use of race in public higher education over twenty-
five years before in Bakke, and that the only holding by a majority of the 
Bakke Court was that states have a substantial interest that may be served 
by a properly devised admissions program that involved the consideration 
of race.
144
  In Grutter, Justice O’Connor adopted Justice Powell’s view in 
Bakke that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that may 
justify the use of race in university admissions.
145
  Recognition of this 
compelling interest was not enough;
 Justice O’Connor then proceeded to 
subject the Law School’s admissions process to strict scrutiny review.146  
As a foundation for her review, Justice O’Connor asserted that “not every 
decision influenced by race is equally objectionable.”147  Here, because the 
Law School’s interest was not simply to assure a percentage of a particular 
group within its student body merely because it its race, but to achieve the 
“critical mass” necessary to provide educational benefits from diversity,148 
Justice O’Connor found the Law School’s interest compelling.149  Justice 
O’Connor next looked to the means chosen to accomplish the Law 
School’s interest to determine whether they were specifically and narrowly 
framed to accomplish that purpose such that there was little possibility that 
the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereo-
type.
150
  Further, again citing Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke, Justice 
O’Connor found that for a race-conscious admissions program to be nar-
  
 142. Id. at 306. 
 143. Id. at 318. 
 144. Id. at 322–23. 
 145. Id. at 325. 
 146. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
 147. Id. at 327.  This statement is noteworthy given that Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in 
Adarand suggested that all racial classifications would be subject to the most exacting judicial scrutiny 
by the Court.  See Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of 
Texas: An Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 437, 453 (2011). 
 148. Justice O’Connor outlined the benefits of diversity touted by the University of Michigan in her 
opinion.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–32. 
 149. Id. at 325.  
 150. Id. at 333. 
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rowly tailored, it could not use a quota system or insulate each category of 
applicants with certain qualifications from competition with all other ap-
plicants, and instead, the program must be flexible enough to consider all 
elements of diversity in light of the qualifications of each applicant.
151
  
Justice O’Connor found that the Law School’s admissions program was 
this type of narrowly tailored plan because it did not operate as a quota 
system; rather, each applicant was evaluated individually without giving 
any race more or less weight based on their race.
152
  As a result, Justice 
O’Connor and a majority of the Court found the Law School’s admissions 




Despite upholding the Law School’s admissions process in Grutter, 
Justice O’Connor noted that race-conscious admissions policies must be 
limited in time, as the primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on 
race.
154
  O’Connor suggested that this durational requirement may be met 
in the context of higher education by sunset provisions in race-conscious 
admissions processes and periodic reviews to determine whether racial 
preferences are still necessary to achieve diversity, and further, she noted 
that universities should draw on the most promising aspects of race-neutral 
alternatives as they develop.
155
  Finally, Justice O’Connor and the majority 
of the Court noted their expectation that twenty-five years from the date of 
their opinion—by 2028—“the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest [in diversity].”156 
Together, Grutter and Gratz made clear that the Court had joined Jus-
tice O’Connor’s commitment to both remedying past government discrim-
ination on the basis of race and in ensuring that any current race-based 
decision-making by state actors must survive strict review.
157
  Consequent-
ly, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Court’s jurisprudence 





 151. Id. at 334. 
 152. Id. at 335–36. 
 153. Id. at 343. 
 154. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342–43. 
 155. Id. at 342. 
 156. Id. at 343; see also Gerald Torres, We Are on the Move, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 355, 361 
(2010). 
 157. See supra notes 134–156 and accompanying text (exploring Grutter and Gratz). 
 158. See supra Section III–IV(B) (tracing the Court’s race and education jurisprudence). 
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2. After Grutter v. Bollinger 
In 2005, the Court again reaffirmed the application of strict scrutiny 
review to race-conscious state actions in Johnson v. California.
159
  Writing 
for the majority, Justice O’Connor applied strict scrutiny review to a pris-
on’s policy of placing new or transferred inmates with cellmates of the 
same race.
160
  Instead of quickly resolving Johnson on the historical defer-
ence given to the needs of prison administrators, as urged by the dissent, 
Justice O’Connor reaffirmed the Court’s prior holdings that all racial clas-
sifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny, 
regardless of the motive behind the classification,
161
 and remanded the case 
to the district court to apply strict scrutiny review.
162
 
By the time Justice O’Connor retired from the Court in 2005, the 
Court’s application of strict scrutiny review to all race-conscious decision-
making by state actors was clear.
163
  In the context of education, it was 
evident that the government might successfully offer two different compel-
ling interests to withstand this scrutiny—remedying past discrimination 
and achieving diversity of a critical mass through university admissions.
164
  
However, government’s actions to achieve these compelling interests must 
be narrowly tailored, and only few race-conscious actions would withstand 
this degree of heightened scrutiny by the Court.
165
 
V. ANALYSIS  
Justice O’Connor served on the Court during a fundamentally trans-
formative time in the nation’s history, as the Court struggled to define the 
tangible meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of educa-
tion.
166
  At a superficial review, it is clear that Justice O’Connor shepherd-
ed strict scrutiny judicial review of race-conscious decision-making by 
government actors from a minority view to the view of a majority of the 
Court.
167
  However, Justice O’Connor’s influence on the Court’s race and 
  
 159. 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
 160. Id. at 502, 509. 
 161. Compare id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting) with id. at 509 (O’Connor, J.). 
 162. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 515. 
 163. See supra Section IV (noting the consistent application of strict scrutiny by the Court). 
 164. See supra notes 111 and 145 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s embrace of these com-
pelling interests). 
 165. See supra Section IV (making note of the Court’s application of strict scrutiny review). 
 166. See supra Section IV (highlighting the Court’s race and education jurisprudence during Justice 
O’Connor’s tenure). 
 167. See supra Section IV (highlighting the Court’s race and education jurisprudence during Justice 
O’Connor’s tenure). 
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education jurisprudence stretches much further, as this section will illus-
trate.
168
  This section will address: (A) the state of the law after Grutter, 
(B) the Court’s jurisprudence after Justice O’Connor’s tenure, and (C) the 
future of race-conscious decision-making in education and Justice 
O’Connor’s legacy in this area. 
A. State of the Law after Grutter 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter was the culmination of 
many years of addressing race in the context of education during her tenure 
on the Court.
169
  As such, it should serve as the basis for review of Justice 
O’Connor’s impact on this area of the Court’s jurisprudence.  As will be 
discussed in this section, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter established 
three principles: (1) diversity in education is a compelling government 
interest; (2) although university admissions policies must be narrowly tai-
lored to survive judicial review, universities have a significant degree of 
autonomy to adopt standards consistent with their educational mission; and 
(3) Grutter’s holding will expire in twenty-five years from its issuance. 
1. Diversity as a Compelling Interest 
The Court’s clear embrace in Grutter of diversity as a compelling in-
terest for purposes of Equal Protection analysis in higher education cases 
was built on a growing notion in the Court’s jurisprudence that education 
must prepare students for the diverse world they were certain to encounter 
as an adult.
170
  Justice O’Connor garnered five votes for this diversity ra-
tionale in Grutter, a significant change from support of this rationale by 
only Justice Powell in Bakke.
171
  Instead of aiming merely to eliminate 
racial discrimination through conscious placement of students, an interest 
in diversity aims to achieve a student body of varied ethnicities for the 
purpose of educating all students so that they each may be better prepared 
for the world.
172
  Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter includes several 
assertions to this effect as proof of the compelling nature of universities 
achieving diversity,
173
 and it is not difficult to imagine that Justice 
  
 168. See infra Section V(A) (analyzing Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter and other cases). 
 169. See supra Section IV (tracing the Court’s race and education jurisprudence during Justice 
O’Connor’s tenure through her opinions). 
 170. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324, 330–31. 
 171. Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti-Affirmative 
Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1147 (2009). 
 172. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331–32 (discussing the benefits of achieving diversity in higher educa-
tion). 
 173. Supra note 148. 
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O’Connor understood and appreciated diversity from her own experiences 
as well.  Justice O’Connor’s exposure to individuals of different races as a 
child at Lazy B and her experiences at Stanford as one of only a small per-
centage of female law students perhaps led her to not only appreciate learn-
ing from diverse individuals, but to view the experiences of individuals 
with different backgrounds as necessary to a good education.
174
   
Some legal scholars have praised Grutter’s embrace of diversity as a 
compelling interest as a “win-win for universities,” as universities relying 
on diversity are not forced to show evidence of their own past racial dis-
crimination and rarely must state the characteristics that qualify or disqual-
ify applicants.
175
  Further, while traditional affirmative action programs 
appear more exclusive, seeming to demand that people acknowledge and 
assume responsibility for a history of racial oppression, diversity initiatives 
seem to lack a remedial component and suggest a more forward-looking 
orientation.
176
  As a result, the word diversity appears more inclusive, and a 
wider range of society can envision themselves as beneficiaries of pro-
grams aimed at achieving diversity.
177
  
Although Justice O’Connor clearly embraced diversity as a compelling 
interest, her majority opinion in Grutter left murky the distinction between 
remedial measures and diversity measures.
178
  Her opinion generally 
avoided traditional remediation rhetoric and instead touted the benefits of 
diversity, but at the same time spoke of time limits for universities’ abili-
ties to utilize race-conscious admissions programs, suggesting that the 
State’s interest was remedial.179  In particular, Justice O’Connor’s state-
ment that the university’s diversity plan would no longer be justified twen-
ty-five years after the Court’s opinion suggests that the Court upheld the 
admissions plan as a remedial measure, instead of as a means to ensure the 
student body diversity necessary to provide a sound university educa-
tion.
180
  As a result, while Grutter clearly embraced diversity as a compel-
ling interest in higher education, it is not clear whether the Court truly re-
lied on this interest to uphold the University’s admissions process, and as 
such, whether an interest in diversity alone can justify future race-
  
 174. See supra Section II (discussing Justice O’Connor’s childhood experiences and education). 
 175. West-Faulcon, supra note 171, at 1147–48. 
 176. Barnes, supra note 91, at 1001–02. 
 177. See Barnes, supra note 91, at 1002 (describing diversity as “a source of relief for racial inequali-
ty”). 
 178. Compare supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that the Grutter Court embraced diver-
sity as a compelling interest) with Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Argot of Equality: On the Im-
portance of Disentangling “Diversity” and “Remediation” as Justifications for Race-Conscious Gov-
ernment Action, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 907, 918 (2010) (asserting that Grutter was based on both diver-
sity and remediation interests). 
 179. Krotoszynski, supra note 178, at 918. 
 180. Id.at 935–36. 
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conscious decision-making in higher education.
181
  Finally, to further 
weaken diversity as a reliable compelling interest for race-based measures, 




2. Narrowly Tailored, but not Fatal in Fact 
By the time Grutter and Gratz reached the Court, it was clear that strict 
scrutiny review would be applied to all racial classifications by state actors 
and would require that the state’s actions be narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling government interest.
183
  Justice O’Connor garnered a majority 
of votes from the Court to apply strict scrutiny in Shaw v. Reno,
184
 and the 
Court had applied strict scrutiny in each subsequent encounter of racial 
classifications.
185
  Consequently, it is not surprising that in Grutter, the 
Court required that the University of Michigan’s admissions policy be nar-
rowly tailored to its interest in achieving student body diversity. 
Justice O’Connor utilized the opportunity that Grutter offered to clari-
fy what narrowly tailored entails in the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis.186  
Justice O’Connor defined the Court’s narrowly tailored test as requiring 
that “[t]he means chosen to accomplish the government’s asserted purpose 
must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose” and 
that “the means chosen [must] fit . . . so closely that there is little or no 
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate.”187  This 
elaboration on the Court’s narrowly tailored review suggested that few, if 
any, governmental actions that employ racial classifications will fit closely 
enough with the state’s compelling interest to pass constitutional muster.  
However, other parts of Justice O’Connor’s opinion indicated that the nar-
rowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny is not intended to make judi-
cial review “fatal in fact”188 and that “[n]arrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”189  This suggests 
  
 181. Supra notes 178–180 and accompanying text. 
 182. Thompson, supra note 147, at 475. 
 183. See supra Section IV (exploring the evolution of the Court’s race jurisprudence and adoption of 
strict scrutiny review). 
 184. Supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 185. Supra notes 124–162 and accompanying text. 
 186. Infra notes 187–189 and accompanying text.  The Court did not expound upon the “narrowly 
tailored” requirement in Shaw and Adarand; instead, the Court remanded both cases to the lower courts 
to apply the strict scrutiny analysis.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238–39 
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993). 
 187. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. 
 188. Id. at 326. 
 189. Id. at 339. 
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that state actors have a significant degree of latitude for race-based deci-
sion-making in education.  
Because the education context influenced the Court in articulating the 
constitutionally required fit necessary in Grutter, the special characteristics 
of education identified by Justice O’Connor are worth noting.190  For Jus-
tice O’Connor in Grutter, academic freedom had been historically viewed 
as a special concern of the First Amendment,
191
 and there was a tradition of 
giving deference to a university’s academic decisions.192  In fact, while the 
Court noted that deference would only be given within the bounds of con-
stitutional limits, it openly deferred to the Law School’s “educational 
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission.”193  
Because the Law School’s admissions policy was not an outright quota 
system of the type rejected in Bakke and because the Law School claimed 
that its admissions process left ample opportunity for individualized re-
view, the Grutter Court found that it was narrowly tailored to the Law 
School’s interest in diversity in education.194  As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
argued in dissent, the Law School presented little concrete evidence to 
demonstrate exactly how race factored into both individual admissions and 
the Law School admissions as a whole.
195
  Such deference to the Law 
School suggests that the Court’s strict scrutiny review in race-based deci-
sion-making is perhaps much less rigorous in education contexts than strict 
scrutiny, as defined, might suggest.
196
  As a result, it is questionable 
whether Justice O’Connor in fact left the Court with strict scrutiny—
requiring ends narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest—firmly 
intact as the proper standard of review in all racial classifications by state 
actors. 
3. A Twenty-Five Year Expiration for Grutter 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter is frequently cited for her decla-
ration that “25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer 
be necessary to further the interest approved [in Grutter].”197  Her assertion 
  
 190. Infra notes 191–193 and accompanying text. 
 191. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324. 
 192. Id. at 328; see also generally Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a “Degree of Defer-
ence”: Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217 (2011) 
(discussing Grutter’s impact on deference to university officials). 
 193. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
 194. Id. at 334–39. 
 195. Id. at 379–87. 
 196. Mark S. Kende, Reviving Pragmatism in Constitutional Law: U.S. Opportunities and South 
African Examples, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 679, 695 (2010). 
 197. See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1369 (2010); 
Torres, supra note 156, at 361. 
File: Campbell Article Created on: 12/4/2012 8:31:00 PM Last Printed: 12/11/2012 3:04:00 AM 
2012 FROM GRUTTER TO FISHER 261 
was based on the premise that race-conscious programs require a termina-
tion point in order to assure that differing from the norm of equal treatment 
is only a temporary practice,
198
 and arguably, is based on an underlying 
commitment to equality unhampered by race that is greater than an appre-
ciation for diversity.  This underlying value judgment is expected to the 
extent that Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter was shaped by 
her own experiences.
199
  While Justice O’Connor benefited and learned 
from exposure to workers of differing backgrounds during her time at Lazy 
B, her ability to receive a legal education equal to that of her male peers 
and her own struggle with obtaining an equal employment opportunity 
after graduation from law school likely had a greater impact on her life.  
As such, it would not be surprising if she intended Grutter to embrace ul-
timate equality as a greater concern than achieving diversity.  
As evidenced by the several references to Justice O’Connor’s state-
ment by the rest of the Court, it is unclear whether this termination point 
was intended as an expectation, a limitation, or a mere hopeful projec-
tion.
200
  Regardless of the intent behind this statement, the Court is sure to 
be faced with a strong argument in 2028, twenty-five years after Grutter, 
that race-conscious programs can no longer be upheld.
201
 
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence After Justice O’Connor’s Tenure 
In 2007, following Justice O’Connor’s retirement, the Court reviewed 
the proper role for race in the education context in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.
202
  Consequently, Par-
ents Involved offers the best foundation for determining the holding power 
of Justice O’Connor’s contributions to race and education jurisprudence.  
This section will address: (1) the Court’s opinion in Parents Involved and 
(2) how Parents Involved changed the Court’s race and education jurispru-
dence. 
1. Parents Involved in Community Schools 
In Parents Involved, the Court faced the question of whether a public 
school that had not operated segregated schools or found to be unitary may 
  
 198. LaCroix, supra note 197, at 1369. 
 199. See Joyce, supra note 19 (suggesting such a connection); see also Christopher E. Smith,  Justice 
John Paul Stevens: Staunch Defender of Miranda Rights, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 99, 106 (2010) (quoting 
Justice O’Connor) (“We bring whatever we are as people to a job like the Supreme Court.”). 
 200. LaCroix, supra note 197, at 1370–71. 
 201. Id. at 1371 (“[W]ith the tolling of the twenty-five year period . . . the era of race-conscious 
admissions policies in higher education will come to an end.”). 
 202. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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The Parents Involved Court based their analysis on the “well estab-
lished” proposition that when the government distributes burdens or bene-
fits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action will be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny.
204
  In order to satisfy this standard of review, 
the Court noted that the school districts must demonstrate that the use of 
individual racial classifications is narrowly tailored to achieve a compel-
ling government interest.
205
  In Parents Involved, the Court took these 
principles as firmly established truths of constitutional law, citing to Jus-
tice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter and other cases.206  Before analyzing 
the school district plans, the Court also noted that they had only recognized 
two interests as compelling to justify race-based decision-making.
207
  First, 
the Court identified remedying the effects of past intentional discrimina-
tion as a compelling interest, but only where the harm being remedied by a 
mandatory desegregation plan is the harm traceable to segregation, not 
mere racial imbalance.
208
  Second, the Court pointed again to Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter and noted a very specific interest in student 
body diversity in the context of higher education, focused not on race 
alone, but encompassing all factors that may contribute to student body 
diversity.
209
  Finally, in Parents Involved, the Court made clear that racial 
balancing can never be a compelling state interest.
210
 
In Parents Involved, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the school dis-
trict’s racial classifications, first determining whether the state had a com-
pelling interest in this case.
211
  The Court rejected diversity as an interest in 
the case before it because the school district had not considered race as part 
of a broader effort to achieve “exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, 
ideas, and viewpoints,” as the University of Michigan Law School had in 
Grutter.
212




 203. Id. at 711. 
 204. Id. at 720 (citing, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326). 
 205. Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
 206. Id. at 720. 
 207. Id. at 720–22. 
 208. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720–21 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S 467, 494 (1992); Milli-
ken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)). 
 209. Id. at 722.  The Court noted that “[t]he entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the admis-
sions program at issue there focused on each applicant as an individual, and not simply as a member of 
a particular racial group.”  Id. 
 210. Id. at 730–31 (citing Grutter for the proposition that outright racial balancing is “patently uncon-
stitutional”). 
 211. Id. at 720.  
 212. Id. at  723. 
 213. Id.  The Court found the Seattle School District’s plan more akin to the admissions program 
struck down in Gratz, instead of the meaningful, individualized review upheld in Grutter.  Id. 
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Further, the considerations unique to higher education outlined by the 
Court in Grutter were not present here.
214
  As a result, in Parents Involved, 
the Court found that the present case was not governed by Grutter, and 
diversity did not lie as a valid compelling interest for the state.
215
  Out of 
the several offered interests, the Court found that only the school district’s 
interest in remedying past discrimination was compelling.
216
 
The Court then subjected the school district’s actions to strict scrutiny, 
noting that the school district seeking a “worthy” goal did not mean that 
their racial classifications would be subject to less exacting scrutiny.
217
  
The Court found that the school district’s actions were not narrowly tai-
lored to achieving its interest, as the “minimal effect” of student assign-
ments suggested that other means would be effective and the district failed 
to show “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alter-
natives.”218  The Court not only based both of these considerations on Jus-
tice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter, but also compared the facts before 
them to those found to support the constitutionality of the University of 
Michigan Law School’s admissions process.219  Finally, the Court ended its 
opinion with the strong assertion that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”220 
2. How Parents Involved Changed Race and Education Jurisprudence 
The Court reaffirmed the central holdings of Grutter in Parents In-
volved, as the Court held that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of 
review to apply to the plaintiff’s claims of state classifications based on 
race, and that only two state interests could be compelling: remedying the 




However, the Court’s opinion in Parents Involved seemed to limit the 
availability of diversity as a compelling interest, repeatedly noting that 
Grutter embraced diversity only in the context of higher education, and 
declining to allow diversity as a compelling interest in secondary education 
  
 214. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 724–26. 
 215. Id. at 725. 
 216. Id. at 720–21, 731–32.  It should be noted that the Court found that only the Jefferson City 
school district’s interest in remedying past discrimination was compelling, as there was no evidence of 
past intentional discrimination in the Seattle school district.  Id. 
 217. Id. at 743.  
 218. Id. at 734–36. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. 
 221. Michael P. Pohorylo, Note, The Role of Parents Involved in the College Admissions Process, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 693, 714 (2009). 
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cases.
222
  At the same time, Parents Involved did little to address the con-
stitutional line between remedial efforts and proactive measures to achieve 




The Court emphasized two reasons why the secondary school assign-
ment plans were not narrowly tailored, and as such, not constitutional: the 
two reassignment plans only had a marginal impact in achieving diverse 
student bodies, and the school district showed no evidence of consideration 
of alternatives that were not based on race.
224
  
Because courts often find holdings involving K-12 education instruc-
tive in cases where one party is a university or college, and give similar 
treatment in the reverse, Parents Involved can be viewed together with 
Grutter to determine the Court’s current race and education jurispru-
dence.
225
  To the extent that Grutter and Parents Involved may be viewed 
together, the Court has added additional requirements to racial classifica-
tions that wish to pass constitutional muster.  First, racial classifications 
must show significant measurable success.
226
  Minor gains in creating a 
diverse student body will not survive strict scrutiny.
227
  Second, if favora-
ble race-neutral alternatives exist, then a plan that employs the use of race 
is not narrowly tailored.
228
  State actors must clearly prove their considera-
tion of such alternatives as well as provide evidence to the court that race-
neutral alternatives are not favorable.
229
  These requirements arguably sig-
nal that the current Court has grown increasingly reluctant to continue its 
typical deference to affirmative action in higher education.
230
 
The number of cases filed by plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination 
against students has been limited since Parents Involved was decided in 
2007, and lower courts facing such claims have ruled consistent with the 
  
 222. Ellison S. Ward, Toward Constitutional Minority Recruitment and Retention Programs: A 
Narrowly Tailored Approach, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 609, 628 (2009). 
 223. Krotoszynski, supra note 179, at 918. 
 224. Pohorylo, supra note 222, at 714-15.  
 225. Id. at 715–16.  But see Coal. for Equity & Excellence in Maryland Higher Educ., Inc. v. Md. 
Higher Educ. Comm’n, CIV.A. CCB-06-2773, 2011 WL 2217481 (D. Md. June 6, 2011) ) (analyzing 
plaintiff’s claim of Title VII violations in higher education under United States v. Fordice and Grutter, 
without mention of Parents Involved); Pohorylo, supra note 222, at 716 (“Grutter is still good law and 
the holding of Parents Involved has not been incorporated into higher education and will not be a part 
of higher education law until a case is before the courts which warrants its application.”). 
 226. Pohorylo, supra note 222, at 716–17. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 717–18. 
 229. Id. at 718. 
 230. Kimberly A. Pacelli, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Navigating the Narrows between 
Grutter and Parents Involved, 63 ME. L. REV. 569, 570 (2011). 
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Court’s jurisprudence.231  For instance, in 2009, the Sixth Circuit noted that 
the Court has held that the “transition to a unitary, nonracial system of pub-
lic education was and is the ultimate end” of its desegregation jurispru-
dence, and that once the effects of prior discrimination have been cured, 
race-conscious federal judicial supervision of the school district ends.
232
  
The Sixth Circuit overwhelmingly echoed the sentiment of the Parents 
Involved Court in its opinion.
233
  Similarly, in 2010, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied strict scrutiny to 
the plaintiffs’ allegation that they were unable to choose between two high 
schools as a result of their race.
234
  The district court echoed the Court’s 
jurisprudence that disparate impact alone is not enough to show violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause, and the existence of one primarily black 
high school may be acceptable if it results from the desire to meet race-
neutral, compelling interests.
235
  As a result, Parents Involved remains the 
final word in the Court’s race and education jurisprudence.236  
The Parents Involved Court based much of its opinion on Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter and similar prior holdings of the 
Court that embraced strict scrutiny judicial review.
237
  At the same time, 
Parents Involved constrained the central holding of Grutter to a very nar-
row context, as the Court found that diversity could be compelling only in 
the context of higher education.
238
  As a result, Justice O’Connor’s contri-
bution to the Court’s race and education jurisprudence remained strong, 




 231. See infra notes 232–132 (discussing various post-Parents Involved cases); Pohorylo, supra note 
222, at 722–23 
 232. Robinson v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 566 F.3d 642, 650–51 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Fell v. 
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 2010-CA-001830-MR, 2011 WL 4502673 at *1-2, 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 
Sept. 30, 2011) (noting that federal supervision ends when the effects of prior discrimination have been 
cured).  Cf. Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that 
the district court could not abdicate its responsibility to retain jurisdiction until the school district both 
demonstrated good faith and eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable). 
 233. Robinson, 566 F.3d at 656. 
 234. Student Doe 1 v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 09-2095, 2010 WL 2595278, at *1, *3 (E.D. Pa. 
June 24, 2010). 
 235. Id. at *2–3; see also Everett v. Juvenile Female 1, 6:69-CV-702-H, 2011 WL 3606539, at *2 
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2011) (“The fact that the plan results in schools that do not reflect the racial com-
position of the school system as a whole does not mean that the plan is unconstitutional.”). 
 236. See Jacob E. Meusch, Note, Equal Education Opportunity and the Pursuit of “Just Schools”: 
The Des Moines Independent Community School District Rethinks Diversity and the Meaning of “Mi-
nority Student,” 95 IOWA L. REV. 1341, 1350 (2010) (“Parents Involved represents the most recent 
major decision regarding the issue of school desegregation”). 
 237. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) 
(citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)).  
 238. Id. at 724-25.  
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C. The Future of Race-Conscious Decision-Making in Education 
Equality has been a shifting concept throughout the history of the 
United States.
239
  The Court’s jurisprudence has consistently evolved over 
time to address shifting notions of equality, sharpening the promise of the 
Equal Protection Clause,
240
 particularly in the area of race and education.
241
  
As such, Justice O’Connor’s impact on the Court’s race and education ju-
risprudence cannot only be measured through Parents Involved; rather, we 
must consider her legacy in the context of both cases currently pending and 
the perception of race in our society today. 
1. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
The Fifth Circuit ruled on the University of Texas’ race-conscious ad-
missions policy in early 2011 in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,
242
 
attracting nationwide attention once again to the use of race in university 
admissions.
243
  Petition for certiorari was granted by the Court on February 
21, 2012, and the Court will hear oral arguments in the fall of 2012 after 
briefs are filed during the summer of 2012.
244
  Commentators have noted 
that Fisher provides the Court with the opportunity to revisit Grutter and 
will be the next “big” case in the Court’s race and education jurispru-
dence.
245
   
  
 239. Barnes, supra note 92, at 968. 
 240. Nicholas F. Brescia, Modernizing State Voting Laws that Disenfranchise the Mentally Disabled 
with the Aid of Past Suffrage Movements, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 943, 948–49 (2010) (citing the Court’s 
use in Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966) of the strict scrutiny test 
for laws limiting an individual’s right to vote). 
 241. Cf. Pacelli, supra note 231, at 570 (describing jurisprudence regarding the use of race in college 
admissions as having a “long and complex history”). 
 242. 631 F.3d 213, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 11-345, 2012 WL 538328 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2012). 
 243. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Fifth Circuit Approves Race-Based Admissions at Univ. of Texas, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/19/fifth-circuit-approves-race-
based-admissions-at-univ-of-texas/.  The United States and twenty-eight other organizations participat-
ed as amicus curiae before the Fifth Circuit, and many are expected to similarly participate before the 
Court.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL 
4352286, at *4 (U.S. Sept. 15, 2011). 
 244. See Supreme Court of the United States, Docket File for Fisher v. University of Texas, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm (noting that Petition 
was granted on February 21, 2012, the time to file petitioner’s brief on the merits is extended to and 
includes May 21, 2012, and the time to file respondents’ brief on the merits is extended to and includes 
August 6, 2012); Lyle Denniston, Affirmative Action Review Due Next Term, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 
2012, 4:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=139196 (noting that Fisher “will go over for argument 
in the next Term, starting October 1”). 
 245. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 147, at 440; Mike Sacks, Is the End Near for Affirmative Ac-
tion?, FIRST ONE @ ONE FIRST (Jan. 18, 2011), https://f11f.wordpress.com/2011/01/18/is-the-end-near-
for-affirmative-action/.  Some have noted that Fisher provides the first opportunity since Parents 
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In 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a diversity initiative that guaran-
tees admission to public Texas universities and colleges to Texas students 
graduating in the top ten percent of their high school class (the “Top Ten 
Percent Law”).246  Those students who are not given automatic admission 
under the Top Ten Percent Law compete for admission to the University of 
Texas based on their Academic and Personal Achievement Indices, which 
not only makes note of the applicant’s race,247 but also considers it as a 
factor for admission.
248
  The University of Texas admissions plan went 
considerably further than merely seeking diversity across the entering class 
of students; the plan also sought to achieve diversity among major fields of 
study and at the classroom level.
249
  Abigail Fisher and Rachel Micalewicz, 
both Texas residents, were denied undergraduate admission to the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin for the class entering in fall 2008.
250
  Fisher and 
Micalewicz filed suit alleging that the admissions policies of the University 
of Texas discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of 
their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
251
  The 
district court granted summary judgment to the University.
252
 
Echoing much of the Court’s opinion in Grutter, the Fifth Circuit held 
in Fisher that the University’s admissions policy was narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling interest in achieving diversity in a critical mass, ra-
ther than outright racial balancing.
253
  Notably, the Fifth Circuit read the 
Court’s jurisprudence to require scrutiny of the University’s decision mak-
ing process only “to ensure that its decision to adopt a race-conscious ad-
missions policy followed from the good faith consideration Grutter re-
quires,” rather than “second-guess[ing] the merits of the University’s deci-
sion.”254  Applying this deference, the Fifth Circuit found no indication that 
the university did not act in good faith by designing an admissions policy 
  
Involved “to explore what that case might mean for university admissions.”  Pacelli, supra note 231, at 
571. 
 246. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 216-17, 224. 
 247. Id.at 227–28.  
 248. Id. at 226.  An applicant’s “Personal Achievement” score considers their “special circumstanc-
es,” such as leadership qualities, socioeconomic status, and their race. Id. at 228.  The amount of points 
that an applicant may earn based on their race is not specified; rather, the applicant’s file is viewed 
“holistically.”  Id. 
 249. Denniston, supra note 245. 
 250. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 217. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 247.  The Fifth Circuit discussed at length the Court’s findings in Grutter both that diversi-
ty in higher constitutes a compelling interest and that consideration of race must be individualized and 
flexible.  Id. at 220–21. 
 254. Id. at 231. 
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However, Fifth Circuit Justice Emilio Garza noted in his Fisher con-
currence that the deference the Fifth Circuit gave to the University of Tex-
as in following Grutter did not follow the Court’s traditional application of 
strict scrutiny to race-conscious decision-making.
256
  In Judge Garza’s 
view, the use of phrases like “individualized consideration” and “holistic 
review” merely cloud the reality that race is used in essentially the same 
way as it is in rigid quota systems.
257
  As a result, “race now matters in 
university admissions, where, if strict judicial scrutiny were properly ap-
plied, it should not.”258  
As noted, the Court granted certiorari in Fisher on February 21, 
2012,
259
 and certified the following question: whether this Court’s deci-
sions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, including Grutter, permit the University of Texas at Austin’s use of 
race in undergraduate admissions decisions.
260
  While the stated issue be-
fore the Court is whether the University of Texas may continue to use its 
current admissions policy, Grutter’s validity is in danger as well.261  Schol-
ars have aptly noted that the facts of Fisher expose the contradictory hold-
ings of Grutter and Parents Involved: whereas Grutter holds that universi-
ties “need not exhaust” race-neutral alternatives before using racial classi-
fications, Parents Involved requires that racial classifications only be used 
as a “last resort.”262  As such, the Court is faced with reconciling Grutter’s 
embrace of a deferential review of race-conscious university admissions 
programs that is justified by an interest in diversity with the Court’s other-
wise strong embrace of strict scrutiny in all race based state actions.
263
  In 
  
 255. Id. at 247. 
 256. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 247 (Garza, J., concurring). 
 257. Id. at 252. 
 258. Id. at 247. 
 259. Supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 260. See Docket File for Fisher v. University of Texas, Supreme Court of the United States, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm. 
 261. Amy Howe, This Week’s Grants: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 23, 2012, 11:39 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/this-week’s-grants-in-plain-english/; see Jeffrey Toobin, The 
Other Big Supreme Court Case, THE NEW YORKER BLOG (May 1, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
online/blogs/comment/2012/05/the-other-big-supreme-court-case.html (stating that “[t]he case amounts 
to a direct challenge to [Grutter]”).  Some scholars have alternatively argued that the Court is not 
necessarily faced with overruling Grutter in Fisher, but instead, Fisher provides the Court with the 
opportunity to strike down the University of Texas’ admissions policy as a “runaway expansion” of 
Grutter while reaffirming the central holding of Grutter.  See Brief of Amici Curiae California Asso-
ciation of Scholars and Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, in Support of Petitioner, Fisher v. 
University of Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL 4352286 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2011), 2011 WL 5007902. 
 262. Pacelli, supra note 231, at 589. 
 263. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL 
4352286, at *24 (U.S. Sept. 15, 2011) (noting the Court’s history of holding that “governmental racial 
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addition, the composition of the Court deciding Fisher is markedly differ-
ent than the Court that ruled on Grutter.  Three of the Justices who dissent-
ed in Grutter—Justices Kennedy,264 Scalia and Thomas—continue to be 
firmly opposed to affirmative action, as does Justice Roberts, who suc-
ceeded the fourth dissenter in Grutter, Justice Rehnquist.
265
  In addition, 
the author of the Court’s opinion in Grutter, Justice O’Connor, has been 
replaced by Justice Alito, who is more likely to find the University of Tex-
as’ policy unconstitutional than his predecessor.266  Finally, Justice Kagan 
has recused herself from Fisher,
267
 leaving Justices Sotomayor, Breyer and 
Ginsburg as the only members of the Court who are consistent supporters 
of affirmative action and can be counted on to uphold Grutter’s legacy.268  




b. Race in America Today 
Beginning with Grutter, the Court limited the consideration of race in 
university admissions and secondary school integration plans.
270
 As a re-
sult, legal scholars have argued that these and subsequent cases signal a 
return to post-racial ideology and analysis, where race-based decision-
making is no longer warranted because racial discrimination no longer 
exists.
271
  Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter that race-conscious so-
  
classifications demand the most exacting judicial examination”) (internal citations omitted) with infra 
Section IV(A)(a) and accompanying text (discussing Grutter). 
 264. Justice Kennedy dissented from Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion, and again in Parents In-
volved, expressing negative sentiments about the very concept of remedial racial preferences.  See 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 798 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[M]easures other than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first 
must be exhausted.”); Scott A. Moss, The Courts Under President Obama, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 727, 
734 (2009); Pacelli, supra note 231, at 577 (noting that Justice Kennedy’s vote will be crucial in future 
cases); see also Corrada, supra note 8, at 242 (noting that Justice Kennedy “has adopted key elements 
of Justice O’Connor’s position on affirmative action: hostile and restrictive, yes, but not entirely op-
posed to it as are the more conservative members of the Court.”).  
 265. Howe, supra note 262. 
 266. Id.  Justice Alito signaled opposition to any consideration of race in Parents Involved.  Moss, 
supra note 265, at 734. 
 267. Lyle Denniston, Affirmative Action Review Due Next Term, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 2012, 4:38 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=139196. 
 268. See Toobin, supra note 262 (stating “[t]hat leaves only three Democratic appointees—Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor—as likely votes in favor of affirmative ac-
tion”).  
 269. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 264 (Garza, J., concurring); see Toobin, supra note 262 (stating that Grutter 
was the “most famous decision authored by Sandra Day O’Connor”). 
 270. See Barnes, supra note 92, at 972 (noting the post-racial ideology of the Court after Grutter). 
 271. Barnes, supra note 92, at 972.  Barnes points to Parents Involved as a judicial assertion that the 
Equal Protection Clause requires colorblindness and bars any effort at race-based remedies for discrim-
ination and segregation.  Id. at 974. 
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lutions should end twenty-five years after that decision embraces this post-
racial ideology,
272
 as does Justice Garza’s concurrence in Fisher.  Propo-
nents of affirmative action argue that the Court’s growing tendency to ac-
cept post-racial ideology ignore the ways in which racism has been in-
grained, and continues to produce effects, in systems and structures of the 
United States.
273
  They note that while post-racialism emphasizes stories of 
individual success, it does not adequately account for the disparate condi-
tions under which minorities struggle that cause minorities to compare 
unfavorably to whites among almost all measures of economic and social 
success.
274
  Consequently, proponents of affirmative action argue that the 
Court’s growing adoption of post-racialism “ignores how race operates” 
and does not go far enough to achieve equality.
275
  While Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter suggests that diversity will remain a com-
pelling state interest in higher education and that programs that consider 
applicants’ diversity as one factor in making admissions decisions will 
remain valid for another twenty years, the adoption of post-racialism by 
several sitting Justices suggests that the Court will soon, perhaps as early 
as within the next year through Fisher, reject race-based remedies in all but 
the most egregious intentional discrimination cases.
276
 
Not only is the present Court poised to strike down any use of affirma-
tive action measures in university admissions, but opponents of affirmative 
action are waging an increasingly vocal national battle over race-conscious 
admissions, not only in the courts, but also through state ballot initia-
tives.
277
  To comply with these initiatives, many public universities have 
eliminated affirmative action policies, which has resulted in a negative 
impact on admissions rates for minorities.
278
  However, these actions may 
  
 272. Barnes, supra note 92, at 975. 
 273. Id. at 979; see also Destiny Perry, The Colorblind Ideal in a Race-Conscious Reality: The Case 
for a New Legal Ideal for Race Relations, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 473 (2011) (arguing that “race 
consciousness in the law is necessary to ensure equal treatment of racial groups in regulated domains 
such as . . . education”). 
 274. Barnes, supra note 92, at 983.  Barnes notes discrepancies in the poverty rate, income and 
wealth, homeownership, employment, education, and criminal justice statistics.  Id. at 984–992. 
 275. Barnes, supra note 92, at 995.  But see Krotoszynski, supra note 179, at 925 (acknowledging the 
pre-university experiences of minorities). 
 276. Barnes, supra note 92, at 996–97. 
 277. West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 1078.  These include California’s Proposition 209, Washing-
ton’s Initiative 200, Michigan’s Proposal 2, and Nebraska’s Initiative 424.  Id.  After initiatives were 
passed in these states, the states passed laws that prohibit public universities from discriminating or 
giving preference on the basis of race.  Id. at 1086.  The Sixth Circuit heard an Equal Protection chal-
lenge to Michigan’s Proposal 2 in 2011.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights & Fight for Equal. by any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 652 
F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Sept. 9, 2011). 
 278. Ward, supra note 223, at 631; West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 1078.  For example, UC Berk-
ley admitted fewer than half the number of African American and Latino students during the first 
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constitute violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibits universities from using admissions criteria that result in discrimi-
nation against applicants on the basis of race.
279
  Further, declining levels 
of minorities admitted arguably constitutes proof that the seemingly race-
blind university admissions process actually discriminates against minori-
ties.
280
  In addition, many universities that have removed race as a factor in 
admissions decisions have created programs designed to increase racial 
diversity through recruiting and retaining minority students.
281
  Proponents 
of these programs argue that they are both necessary to ensure minority 
representation within their universities and are narrowly tailored to achieve 
the state’s compelling interest in diversity.282  However, there is a strong 
argument that not only do these types of minority recruitment and retention 
programs cause a detriment to non-minority students, as they utilize uni-
versity resources that might be used in ways not based on race and provide 
unfair advantages to minority students,
283
 but also that they do more harm 
than good.
284
  As a result, the Court is not only poised to strike down the 
use of race in university admissions, but the climate is ripe for the right 
case to come before the Court for such an outcome that diminishes Justice 
O’Connor’s legacy in this area.285 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s race and education jurisprudence has come a long way 
from its embrace of the “separate but equal” doctrine in education before 
  
admissions cycle without use of affirmative action than the university had admitted the prior year.  Id. 
at 1094.  
 279. West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 1078.  For discussion supporting the idea that such initiatives 
are unconstitutional, see Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight 
for Equal. by any Means Necessary (BAMN), 652 F.3d at 610. 
 280. West-Faulcon, supra note 172, at 1078–79.  For such a claim to succeed, the plaintiff would not 
only need to show decreased admissions, but that the selection process is discriminatory, whether in 
fact or in impact.  Id. at 1095. 
 281. Ward, supra note 223, at 611.  But see id. at 622 (noting that Grutter has led some institutions to 
“make extremely conservative choices that have limited or ended important recruitment and retention 
efforts”). 
 282. Ward, supra note 223, at 611–12.  For exploration of these types of minority recruitment and 
retention programs, see generally id. 
 283. Ward, supra note 223, at 640–41. 
 284. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Gail Heriot et al. in Support of the Petitioner, Fisher v. University of 
Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL 4352286 (U.S. Sept. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 5007903, at *4 (arguing that 
race-preferential admissions have not facilitated the entry of minorities into higher education and high-
prestige careers); Brief Amicus Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of Petition-
er, Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345, 2011 WL 4352286 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2011), 2011 WL 
5015112, at *4–5 (asserting that that racial preference programs in universities have not proven to 
benefit minorities). 
 285. Moss, supra note 265, at 733–34. 
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Brown v. Board of Education.
286
  A child can no longer be turned away 
from a school simply because of his race, and public universities openly 
aim for a racially diverse student body.
287
  Any consideration of race in 
government decision making is now met with strict scrutiny,
288
 and the 
current Court has expressed a strong commitment to colorblindness.
289
 
Much of this transformation in the Court’s race and education juris-
prudence occurred during Justice O’Connor’s tenure on the Court, largely 
due to both Justice O’Connor’s influence on her fellow Justices and her 
firm commitment to both equality and the right of each student to receive 
an excellent and diverse education.
290
  Her majority opinion in Grutter was 
a clear statement by the Court that not only would every race-conscious 
decision made by state actors undergo strict judicial scrutiny, but that pub-
lic universities have a compelling interest in achieving a diverse student 
body.
291




As the Court is faced with claims challenging school placement 
schemes that consider race or university admissions processes that seek 
diverse applicants, particularly in Fisher, Justice O’Connor’s race and edu-
cation framework in Grutter is sure to be challenged.
293
  These cases will 
be the ultimate measure of Justice O’Connor’s influence on the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area.  For now, perhaps it is enough to note that if 
nothing else, the first female Justice, from humble beginnings on a remote 
cattle ranch in Arizona, significantly altered the educational opportunities 
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